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1 Introduction
Internet technology is changing society. The physical distribution of services, processes, and data,
is no longer necessarily the same as the perceived location. Agent technology has made it possible for
autonomous, pro-active digital entities to migrate, communicate, and interact within the digital world
of the Internet. These digital entities, most often called software agents, are autonomous and pro-active.
They learn from the knowledge they acquire in the course of their lives, and most often know "more"
than their original designer or owner within a very limited amount of time. They build profiles of other
agents (human and automated), find information, schedule activities, compare and negotiate offers,
place orders, make payments, close contracts, et cetera. Although they often represent a specific user,
they may also represent an organisation. They often initiate and perform legal transactions.
Legal rules do therefore indicate when technical protection of certain ‘resources’ is needed. Most rules
ask for some form of technical protection. Sometimes, protection is an option open to the owner of the
resources: the criminalisation of hacking does not prescribe that you have to protect your system. The
system owner may choose to have no protection in place; the consequence is of course that a third party
entering the system does not commit the criminal offence of ‘hacking’.
The ALIAS project is an explorative project in which legal experts, computer scientists and AI experts
aim to increase the understanding of the legal and technical implications of the use of software agents.
To this purpose a number of intermediary concepts have been identified: concepts that are of
importance to the use of agents within both fields.  These concepts, however, have their own meaning
within each of the two fields.
This paper consists of the following elements. Section 2 introduces the notion of open and closed
systems. Section 3 describes a generic concept model consisting of  intermediary concepts, legal
concepts and technical concepts of agents. Section 4 analyses a chemical marketplace scenario is
analysed, presenting legal and technical issues. The last part of this paper draws conclusions and
sketches future work.
2 Open and closed systems
A distinction has been made between open and closed systems to indicate the level of regulation within
a system. Within a closed system the data, procedures and actions are well-defined and can be verified.
This implies a high level of integrity: it is clear who can do what when and with which information.
Hospitals are examples of closed systems. Procedures define which patient data, for example, may be
used for which purpose and how. Another clear distinction between open and closed systems is the
distinction between the internet (open) and an intranet (closed).  There are many examples of legal
provisions in which legal consequences are dependent upon the openness and closedness of access to
data, or (human or computer) actions or systems. The criminalisation of hacking protects e.g. systems
and all data and processes within their perimeter against an attack by unauthorised parties (art. 138a
Dutch Criminal Code, hereinafter: DCC). Telecommunications operators have to protect their systems
against eavesdroppers (art. 11.3 Telecommunications Act). Other provisions are more closely tailored
to the protection of data themselves (instead of protection of the system they reside in). The Dutch Data
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or unlawful processing (art. 13 DDPA). Other legal rules do not mention the concept of data, but may
nonetheless have far-reaching implications for data. E.g. a medical doctor has to abide to his
professional confidentiality (art. 272 DCC). This implies that he may not orally disclose information
about the medical status of a patient; it also means that he has to take sufficient security measures to
ensure that patient data that are stored in his computer system remain confidential.
From a technical perspective, open and closed systems are based on three important ingredients: the
data in the system, the procedures that can be attributed to the data, and the possible actions on these
procedures and data, also called tasks. With these three basic ingredients, a closed system requires a
model that enforces access control on the data, procedures, and actions that are used by an agent in an
organisation. In other words, there are restrictions on the information flows implemented with and
within such an organisation. The use of agents within, for example, closed systems for research
purposes raises questions with respect to the legal implications.  Is it possible that a software agent can
access more patient files than, for example, a human agent because a software agent and its
environment are closed and thus more controlled.
The legal implications of the use of software agents for such purposes are not fully understood.
Notions such as anonymity and privacy acquire new meanings in the digital world. New concepts such
as pseudo-anonymity emerge.  It is often unclear if existing legislation is applicable, and when.  More
general legislation with respect to the use of software is available, but there is little tradition, and few
accepted procedures, with respect to the use of software agents. An additional complication is the
cross-border activities in which agents engage. It is often unclear which legal system is applicable in
specific situations. Nevertheless software developers would appreciate knowledge of the implications
of their design choices (if only to decrease liability of the user and/or designer of agent systems).
Six very different scenarios have been devised to study both the distinction between open and closed
systems, and the factors that need to be considered in a conceptual model such as the one presented in
Section 3.  The scenarios studied are:  a) A grocery scenario in which customers of a grocery shop are
assisted by an agent in the collection and payment of goods. b) An email scenario in which agents are
used to perform the basic actions of sending and receiving email, but also to enhance this process with
additional functionality such as certified mail and encrypted mail. c) A chemical marketplace scenario
as described in section 4 of this paper. d) A traffic routing scenario, in which agents are defined on the
basis of their specific tasks, e.g. road-based agents, car based agents and highway pricing agents. e) A
hospital scenario in which a dossier management agent protects hospital data about patients, a planning
agent, and a knowledge management agent that takes care of the distribution of data. f) A civil
government scenario that uses agents to organise an ever-increasing body of diverse knowledge with
regard to the environment in which citizens live, e.g. a counter assistant agent and labour resource
assistants agents.
The traffic routing (d), the hospital (e) and the government (f) scenarios are closed systems. E.g. a
doctor assistant agent has, because of the restrictions on information flow in a hospital, a different set
of data, procedures and actions that it can perform than, for example, an insurance company agent.
In contrast, the grocery (a), the email (b), and chemical marketplace (c) scenarios, have the property
that one or more of the ingredients: data, or procedures on data, or actions can be freely accessed. If an
agent can freely use one of these aforementioned ingredients, then it is part of an open system. In the
chemical marketplace scenario, for example, customers can freely carry out the task of reseller or
seller.  The chemical marketplace is therefore considered to be an open system.
3 A conceptual model for Law and Computer Science
The intermediary concepts considered in this paper are: autonomy, identity, traceability, integrity, and
trust.  These concepts are meaningful to both lawyers and computer scientists and are defined as
follows:
• Autonomy
Autonomy is the ability to act without direct interventions of agents (e.g. humans, software agents,
etc.), or processes, and to have control over ones own actions and internal state.
• Identifiability
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• Traceability
Traceability is the ability to recover the actions of processes or man.
• Integrity
Integrity encompasses authenticity and originality. Authenticity is the ability to conform to the original,
not stained by man or material made causes. In the digital world conforming to the original is rather
difficult.
Authenticity for agents should be interpreted to mean that that the state of the agent not will be changed
by other without agents consent. A method available to ensure this for an agent is to use redundancy in
processes that constitute the agent. The processes can then vote on their results and have a guarantee
that they are authentic. E.g. triple modular redundancy ([1] A. S. Tanenbaum, M. Steen, van. 2002 ,
[12] Schneier B 1997 )  Unfortunately this is best guaranteed when only one of the hosts that run these
processes is under the control or influence of the targeted host, otherwise all processes could be
changed by this host without the agents detecting this. Another method that is available is that logs are
made of the states of the agent. A mathematical function is used to link the successive states in the log
in such a way that an external change to the state can be detected or traced back because of a break in
the chain of states. E.g. in the Ajanta agent platform such a method is used. ([6] N. Karnik, A. Tripathi
2001).
Originality is the ability to distinguish between original and copy. This also is difficult because in the
digital world it is very easy to make copies. With agents, original can be interpreted as being agents
under the control of the originator. Detecting a copy is then finding an unauthorised running agent not
created by the originator. This means that the originator has to keep an administration of the agents that
exist (logging).
• Trust
Trust encompasses reliability, confidentiality, availability, non-excessiveness and safety. Reliability of
an agent process means that the process is able to meet its expectations for the total duration of its
functional cycle. E.g. reliable communication. Confidentiality (also known as exclusiveness) denotes
the ability to limit the availability of private or exclusive content to known authorised parties.
Availability is the ability to have data and processes at ones disposal in such a way that they can be
used. Non-excessiveness means that the means are limited to just that that is necessary to meet ones
goals. Safety (also known as security) is an encompassing concept for the CIA interests (CIA is an
abbreviation for Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability).
3.1 The legal dimension in the conceptual model
The demands that are placed upon agents in the fields of autonomy, identity, traceability, integrity and
trust (fig. 1.) are described with two dimensions: legal and technical.
Fig. 1. The relation between the legal concepts and the intermediary concepts
3.2 Relation between intermediary concepts and legal dimension
The legal dimension has the function of making the meaning of the intermediary concepts more precise
from a legal perspective. To this purpose a number of important legal fields and legal key concepts
have been identified: liability, formation of contract/agreement and evidence. These concepts are not
the only concepts that are of importance: ’privacy’, for instance, is missing. This set, although limited,
illustrates how such general legal concepts play a role in relation to almost all of the intermediate
concepts, although at a detailed level their application may differ. The above mentioned scenarios were
introduced for this reason: to study how and why these legal concepts relate to specific circumstances
Intermediary concepts
Technical conceptsLegal concepts
4and to understand the links between legal concepts and technical concepts as well as their interaction.
Liability, formation of contract/agreement and evidence suffice for the example described in section 4.
Liability plays a prominent role in all phases of a software agent’ s lifecycle (from design to the end of
its active life). Liability considerations may particularly influence design decisions. Liability relates to
all of the intermediary concepts. The autonomy of an agent may constitute a liability risk, as it amounts
to less control over an agent’ s behaviour. Identifiabilty and traceability have a less direct link with
liability, unless the provision of identity or traceability is required by some contractual obligation or
legal duty. Integrity on the other hand, does have a direct link with liability, since a compromise of the
integrity of data or software may directly lead to accidents from which liability flows. Finally, liability
may flow from the misuse of trust, unless the trust was light-heartedly placed.
Contract formation is of importance to software agents that closes contracts or agreements. It also has a
considerable bordering surface with the intermediary concepts. The autonomy of agents may be of
influence to the existence of a contract or agreement. Identifiability and traceability have to a lesser
extent, a bearing on the formation of agreements. The integrity is an important consideration since an
agreement comes about by an exchange of messages. Any inaccuracy in message exchange may
directly influence the contents of the agreement that is to be formed. Trust is also an important
dimension, since the willingness to close agreements with the help of agents depends to a high degree
on the trust that one places/dares to place in software agents.
Evidence is of importance, because in law,  rules about how to materialise ones claims is of  equal
importance to the rules determining what is materially the position of the parties involved. Autonomy
hides the actions of a software agent potentially from the eye of the human beholder/user of the
software agent. This may have implications for possibilities to prove afterwards what happened.
Identifiability and traceability are prerequisites for proof in law. Integrity and trust have a narrow link
with the persuasiveness of evidence.
3.3 The technical dimension in the conceptual model
Fig. 2. The relation between the legal concepts and the intermediary concepts
The technical dimension has the function of making the meaning of the intermediary concepts more
precise from a technical perspective (fig. 2). A number of technical key concepts are identified: names,
protocols, procedures, communication, interaction with the external world, locality,
authorisation/permissions, access control, authentication, logs, mobility and thread of control.
Names are important because an agent needs a label in order to exist and interact with its environment.
How names are given and where in the system is design dependent.
Protocols are needed to provide the formats for agent communication (e.g. TCP/IP) and object
interaction.
Procedures prescribe what an agent needs to do in a specific context to perform a specific task.
Communication refers to the interaction between agents: message passing.
Interaction with the external world refers to the interaction between an agent and its environment:
observations and actions., e.g. by means of method invocations of objects.
Locality indicates to the locations of an agent  (e.g. on which machine).
Access control, authentication, and authorisation/permissions  are three interacting concepts. Access
control is the reflection of a policy, authentication refers to the mechanisms that provide access and
authorisation, permissions describe the meta-data that determine access rights.
Authorisation and permissions are needed to protect data.
Authentication is needed for an autonomous agent to be able to enter a trusted environment.
Intermediary concepts
Technical conceptsLegal concepts
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Mobility refers to the concept of migration: an agent decides to migrate to another location (a so-called
autonomous mobile agent), its code is “shipped” to another location and reactivated.
The final technical concept identified is thread of control: the ability of an agent to have control over
its own actions in its environment.  Fig. 3 provides an overview of the relations that exist between the
intermediary, the legal and technical concepts distinguished.
Fig. 3. An overview of the relations that exist between intermediary,  legal and technical concepts.
4 Illustration of conceptual model
To illustrate the implications of the conceptual model of one of the open systems described in section 2
is analysed: the chemical auction.
In the chemical commodities market there are no central marketplaces. Vendors of supplies cannot be
found easily or have busy agendas and are difficult to contact. Using the Internet, electronic, on-line
marketplaces can be constructed. ([13] Sanders, R. 20001) An electronic marketplace offers at least a
central communication channel through which supply and demand can be matched. This matching can
take place in several forms: a ‘blackboard’  ([4] L. Erman, et al. 1980), whereby interested parties
match their needs based on advertisements on a publicly available meeting place; a marketplace with
(automated) matchmaking through a third party; an auction; and finally through (automated)
negotiation.
Chemicality.com is an electronic, on-line auction, in which agents play an important role. The auction
is a platform through which buyers and sellers can trade in basic chemical commodities like caustic
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6soda, solvents and acids. Chemicality.com uses a number of ways to facilitate trading in chemical
commodities. First, all variables (such as grade, concentration, specs, delivery details) concerning the
commodities are standardised. Secondly, both buyers and sellers are screened before they are allowed
access to the marketplace. To ensure payment of the seller, credit insurance is offered. Thirdly, all
communication is encrypted. In this situation, the auctioneer agent uses a Dutch auction to sell the
chemicals to the buyer agents. The mechanism of a Dutch auction works like this: a chemical is up for
auction with a maximum price in ‘front’  of the auction hall filled with buyers (agents). The prices start
to drop with a predetermined rate and time interval. A buyer agent who represents the company does a
bid when the price is to its liking. The first agent to do this bid acquires the goods, and only has to tell
the auctioneer how much it needs. When an agent participates in an auction, it is possible that
collectives of buyer agents are formed to bargain for lower prices or for reseller-agents to match the
demand of a customer.
In this chemical auction it is necessary to know the user, to be able to close contracts. Since users of
agents are bound to the contracts agents close, they will want to have insight into, and control over, the
activities of their agents in this field. They will need to know which levels of autonomy are possible
and which level of autonomy of  his agent (for example which actions can be taken without  the
owner’ s explicit consent). The user can, and has to, be able to determine the level of autonomy.
 Who the user is, is also relevant with respect to evidence. To recover what happened in the past,  logs
can be inspected. This raises several questions: What events are logged? Who logs them? Who has
access to those logs? How accessible are the logs in the sense that relevant information is easily
identifiable? In fig. 3 the party capable of logging is the auction.  Transparency and control of the
actions of the software agent are thus important. In the following sections, the intermediary concepts as
defined in section 3 are applied to the chemical marketplace and the legal and technical implications of
each of the intermediary concepts in the chemical marketplace are described.
Fig. 4. The relations that parties have to each other in the marketplace.
4.1 Autonomy
• The legal dimension
Close contracts
Contract formation by intelligent agent is subject to debate. ( [8] I.R. Kerr 1999,[10]J.F. Lerouge, 1999,
and [11]J.E.J Prins, S.J.H. Gijrath, 20002, [9] I.R. Kerr 2001.) A bidder uses a software agent in order
to close contracts. A bid constitutes legally the acceptance of an offer to close a purchase agreement.
Because a bidding agent acts autonomously, i.e. without human intervention, one could ask whether the
actions of the bidding agent are suitable to legally bind its user. According to art. 9. Directive on
Electronic Commerce3, one may use electronic means to close a contract. From this, may very well be
concluded that a software agent can be used to bid and thus bind their users. The fact that a software
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7agent can bind its user, does not mean that there cannot be circumstances in which the user is not
bound to the declarations/actions of the agent. Generally, a user will be bound to actions that the agent
performs while it stays within the constraints that were given by its user. In Dutch law, the actions of
the agent may then namely be considered an expression of the will of the user (compare art. 3:33 Dutch
Civil Code)([6] Asser-Hartkamp 4-II 2002). If an agents acts beyond its constraints the user may still
be bound to the contract. This effect may be construed in one of two ways. 1. the act is still an
expression of the will of the user (which may not very often be the case) or 2. the auctioneer could
perceive the act of the agent, conform the meaning that the auction under the circumstances at hand
could reasonably attribute to it, as a bid directed by the user to him (art. 3:35 DCC). E.g.: if the
auctioneer sees that the bidding agent malfunctions, the auctioneer can no longer trust that a bid by the
agent really is a bid and as a consequence, can not make the ‘bid’  stick to the user.
Evidence
The autonomy of an agent may entail that even the user for whom the agent is active does not know
what the agent does or has done. It is therefore wise that an autonomous agent logs its activities, in
order to report them (afterwards) to its user. The user of a bidding agent will e.g. want to know to what
agreements he is bound. There is, however, no general legal requirement to log, store or write down the
agreements one accedes to (which does of course not take away that it very wise to do so). Specifically
with respect to providers of information society services art. 11 Directive on Electronic Commerce3
states that a service provider who receives an order through technological means has to acknowledge
the receipt of the order without undue delay and by electronic means. This rule, however, does not hold
if a contract is concluded exclusively by exchange of electronic mail or by equivalent individual
communications. The order and the acknowledgement of receipt are deemed to be received when the
parties to whom they are addressed are able to access them.4
• The technical dimension
As can be seen in the in fig.4. the auctioneer agent, buyer agent and seller interact with each other.
They have a certain degree of autonomy that must be programmed into the agent. This autonomy is
constrained by the auctioneer with the actual implementation of the auction room, and the companies
sending their mobile agents to attend the auction. To efficiently let the attending agents function the
auctioneer most likely will make available a list of requirements/constraints that it uses in the auction.
With regard to names the auctioneer can, for example, state that it constraints the naming of the agents
by giving aliases to all agents in the auction room. The attending companies can conclude that it is not
possible for their agents to know up front who the contenders are, and that procedures such that the
attending agents autonomously can seek to collaborate before entering the auction is not easily
accomplished. With regard to protocols, or formats for communication, these will most likely be based
on standards such as for example stated by the FIPA organisation and additional custom made
protocols created by the auctioneer. E.g. the auctioneer can create ontologies (knowledge modelling
concepts), and knowledge representation languages. E.g. XML ([4] E.L Harold 2001), DAML5, OIL6
([2] D. Fensel,I. Horrocks,F. Van Harmelen et all. 2000), such that agents can communicate in the
setting of chemicals and auctions. On the part of the customers it will be necessary to incorporate these
protocols in their agents.
Authorisation and permissions, are determined by the auctioneer who provides the environment. To
operate autonomously customers have to acquire these authorisation/permissions and incorporate the
appropriate mechanisms to enable their agents to operate autonomously in this respect.
4.1.1 Identifiability and traceability
• The legal dimension
Liability
 It can be important to a bidder at an auction  other bidders do not know his identity.  The auctioneer
will probably know the identity of the participants at the auction (he has had them screened). If through
a cause attributable to the auctioneer, the identity of a bidder becomes (prematurely) known to other
bidders, a liability may exist. If the auctioneer is subject to the contractual obligation not to make the
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8identities of the bidders known, the liability can be based on breach of contract.7 Alternately the
liability could be based on the general duty to act with due care: the publication of identity may e.g.
under circumstances constitute a breach of privacy.
Evidence
Traceability (in the sense of being able to find out how events unfolded) and identifiability (in the sense
that the identity of persons or objects is known or can be found out) is generally an important
evidentiary asset. If a dispute arises, one of the first questions that needs clarification is the question
about the facts of the dispute: what statements have been made, by whom, to whom, who has done
what and when did it occur? In the determination of the facts of a case, a judge or in fact any other
arbitrator will use evidence. Of course, do computer data, logs, stored files etc. contain a wealth of
information about the facts of an auction dispute. They would in principle make for an almost ideal
means of evidence. But can they? In Dutch Law  it is reassuring to know that in principle everything
can act as a means of evidence (compare art. 179 Dutch Code of Civil Procedure). A judge does not
have to decide on the admissibility of evidence.
• The technical dimension
In order for an agent to enter an auction, it is clear that all customer agents need to know the auctioneer
agent. In this case the identity is static, the name will not change. However, as stated in the previous
section, the names used for the customers are aliases assigned by the auctioneer. Agents can leave and
enter when they like. This means that the aliases are dynamically assigned. To achieve identifiability in
the marketplace, the auction needs a naming service, and the customer agents need a mechanism to
recognise their assigned aliases, and probably be able to pro-actively identify themselves with these
aliases.
Traceability is associated with the technical concepts: names, logs, protocols, procedures, locality,
access control, authentication and authorisation/permissions. Names are an obvious needed in order to
be able to address the agents in the auction. Logs are a needed to backtrack the actions of an agent and
other processes. These logs should possibly be append-only, secure and include timestamps. In the
chemical auction, it is likely that the communicative acts that are used in the bidding process are
logged. Locality indicates where an agent and other processes are situated  (e.g. which machine) If the
auctioneer uses a single host for the auction this is clear. However, if the auction consists of multiple
host, knowing where an agent is becomes more difficult to trace for the owner of an agent attending the
auction. The routes that agents follow in the network and machines of the auction can be of interest.
4.1.2 Integrity
• The legal dimension
Liability
The integrity of software agents, the auction environment and the data they process is essential for the
correct performance of the ‘market’ . The fairness of the bidding process, the determination of the
securing bid, the determination of the modalities of the contract (who bought what quantity of what
substance from whom against which price?) all are highly dependent on the technical integrity of
systems, software and data.
Evidence
As stated by Dutch law everything (including electronic records) can act as a means of evidence. There
is, however, a catch: a judge is free in his/her evaluation of the evidence. ([2] Dijksterhuis-Wieten
1998)  It is up to him/her to decide, if, and to what extent, a piece of evidence ‘convinces’  him/her of
the facts to be proved. In this respect computer data have a weakness: they can be easily manipulated,
deleted, created etc. Therefore a judge will treat ‘computer evidence’  with some care. For the people
who have to rely on computer-generated evidence (e.g. a party in an e-commerce dispute) the
evidential consequences of the manipulatory  nature of computer data is beyond their control. Many
measures can be taken that increase the capacity of computer data in convincing third parties, such as
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9judges. A relying party may take care that it has a clear policy in place about the storage of information
(what is stored by whom and for how long), it may take technical measures such as storage on a
WORM (Write Once Read Many) medium, working with acknowledgements of receipt, using digital
signatures, up-to-date protection against hackers etc. Integrity does not only mean that information that
is available is correct, the information must also be complete. An uninterrupted trace of logs will
enhance the trust that the logs are integer. The better the integrity of logs can be ensured, the larger the
evidentiary value will be.
• The technical dimension
As is stated in section 3 integrity encompasses authenticity and originality. Now in the chemical
marketplace these requirements are possible to meet, because of the transactional nature of the auction:
there are at least two communicating parties needed to close a contract. A possible solution would be
that the agent gives the auctioneer a challenge that is given by the owner. In order to start a transaction
the auction should use this challenge with the owner of the agent in order to verify that this agent is an
authorised copy. This challenge-response protocol should be well known, because these protocols are
best tested with regard to the guarantee that impersonation is not possible while performing the
challenge. As can be seen achieving real integrity requires a careful design of the auction, and can have
major repercussion on performance and cost. In practice the trust and additional guarantees given (e.g.
like used with credit cards) that parties have can possibly relax the requirements for the design of the
auction place.
4.1.3 Trust
• The legal dimension
Liability
Users may lose trust in agents, if ‘accidents’  happen because of imperfections in the interoperability
between software agents and the auction-environment. A possible liability following such accidents can
be based on breach of contract, if there is a contract between the user and the auctioneer, the contract
contains an obligation for the auctioneer concerning the interoperability and the auctioneer did not
abide to this obligation, thus causing the damage. A tortious liability may also exist. This requires inter
alia that negligence on the part of the auctioneer can be established. Non-adherence to agent standards
or non-adherence to interoperability standards (if existent) may in itself not be enough to establish
negligence.([14]C. Stuurman 1995) It may, however, constitute a indication for negligence.
Evidence
Reliability of logging/storage of information with evidentiary value ensures that the information is
available when needed. Especially, if the auctioneer provides the users with their bidding agents, the
trust that the users have may increase  if logs pertinent to the actions of their agents are available for
them and not just for the auctioneer.
• The technical dimension
As said before in this example the names on the market are assigned by the auctioneer. The auctioneer
has an instrument to protect the trust in the auction. On the one hand this guarantees that all agents in
the market are only possible buyers or resellers, on the other had it guarantees the confidentiality of the
agents. Because of the fact that the auctioneer agents have procedures to assign names to agents it also
can enforce access control onto what an agent can do in the trusted environment. The
authorisation/permissions that the auctioneer assigns to an agent regulates who can enter the trust
relationships of the auction. The auctioneer thus has to provide a specification of the authentication
methods the auction uses to enable agents to enter the auction. The bidding process (in this case the
Dutch auction) has to be performed according to protocols and procedures, if the auctioneer does
conform to well known protocols and procedures, it will also increase the trust that the customers have.
Because the auction is closed the communications can be monitored and contained to the auction room
by the auctioneer, thus being private with respect to the outside world. The auctioneer provides the
communication facilities in the auction. By doing this the auctioneer can provide a reliable
communications infrastructure, so it is sure that an agent receives the communication it was sent. The
way the auction is organised means that the customer agents place a lot of trust in the correct workings
of the auction. Therefore, the auction should store the communicative acts, and tasks the auction agent
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can make. The auction should provide a public policy on how these logs are made, managed and
stored. This provides insight into the decisions of the auctioneer onto how, what and why it logs. The
customers can make their own decisions about how trustworthy the auction is and engage in the
auctioning process.
5 Conclusions and future work
This paper presents a conceptual model with which a large number of technical and legal implications
of the use of software agents can be analysed.  An example scenario of an open system with closed
elements, namely a chemical marketplace, has been used to illustrate its use.  It is clear that the scope
of the framework can be broadened to include more legal and technical concepts: this is currently
subject of research.  Current research questions include: does the framework provide insight in the
fields involved?  Will it provide enough support in the design of a “cookbook” for software designers
in which the legal implications of design choices are made clear?  Will it provide support in defining
areas in which legislation is missing, and possibly needed?  One of the platforms in which these
questions will be addressed is the website http://www.iids.nl/alias.  All input is valued.
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